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Solomon Island Nongovernment 
Organizations: Major Environmental Actors
John Roughan
The immediate challenge faced by both the Solomon Islands Govern-
ment and nongovernment organizations working in development and envi-
ronmental matters is how to equitably deliver pertinent insights, infor-
mation, and services to almost 400,000 people living in 5500 widely
dispersed villages, many of which are in the highlands and interior low-
lands, with forbidding terrains and accessible only by footpaths. More
than 50 percent of the country’s scattered villages have fewer than 60
inhabitants.
The modern means of spreading information, understanding, and
awareness—television, radio, print media—are effectively denied the bulk
of the nation, the village dwellers outside the main towns. How then can
vital, necessary, and pertinent environmental, political, cultural, and de-
velopment information, awareness building, and understanding be shared
in a continuous, consistent, and constant manner with a scattered popula-
tion?
Since 1982, the Solomon Islands Development Trust (sidt) has,
through its field staff, media section, theater groups, and departments for
alternative forest harvesting techniques, worked to combat forest destruc-
tion and to pioneer sustainable forestry development. The Pavuvu logging
issue of 1995 became the focus of its development and environmental
efforts.
The Sidt Story
In early 1982, having worked in many Solomon Island districts since
1958, I inaugurated the Solomon Islands Development Trust with fund-
ing from an American nongovernment organization, the Foundation for
the Peoples of the South Pacific. The development philosophy and out-
reach pattern of the new organization were largely drawn from my doc-157
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Malaita, in 1980. The dissertation called for the newly formed institution
to embark on a comprehensive training program for its field staff and
recruited personnel. A board of trustees made up of Solomon Islanders
drawn from local institutions such as the Teachers Union, the National
Provident Fund, and the National Council of Women, directed the orga-
nization to be initially involved in development education, awareness
building, and villager training. Project funding and implementation were
not priority issues.
From the very beginning, the Solomon Islands Development Trust
questioned prevailing development wisdom. Its very first public docu-
ment, A Statement of Resolve, dated September 1982, clarified how it
would work in development, which was understood as primarily a politi-
cal, cultural, and educational process and only secondarily as an eco-
nomic issue (sidt 1982). The trust did not see itself as an agent of change
simply by pushing self-help, grassroots, community projects. It made little
sense to the Solomon Islands Development Trust to fund poultry projects,
for instance, when villagers’ very life sources—forests, streams, rivers,
and reefs—were being destroyed by commercial logging and destructive
fishing practices. But the theoretical underpinnings of the organization
would mean little to island resource owners unless that message were car-
ried to the backbone of the Solomons, the villagers. This development
message was delivered continually, consistently, and constantly through
the use of village-based mobile teams.
The Solomon Islands Development Trust’s working methodology of
more than two hundred fifty trained village workers, conducting work-
shops in local languages in a continuous pattern, equipped the organiza-
tion with hundreds of grassroot “eyes, ears, and hands” capable of
reaching out and informing rural people.
The trust operates in each of the nation’s ten provinces, including
Honiara, with a minimum of four or five teams consisting of three or four
people in each province. Provinces with larger populations, such as
Malaita, Guadalcanal, and Western, have two or more sidt centers with
double the number of team members. These fifty mobile teams, as they
are called, have over the past ten years conducted more than 4500 vil-
lage workshops reaching out to more than 250,000 people (sidt 1982–
1994).
In its first three years of outreach programs—1984–1986—the organ-
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preparing villagers to become more responsive to owning, caring for, and
repairing government-installed water supplies. In each of the following
campaigns, Disaster Awareness and Preparation (1986–1988), Population
Education and Resource Management Understanding (1989–1991), and
Malaria as a Preparation against AIDS (1992–1995), the basic outreach
formula stayed constant. Village leaders gave permission for the mobile
team to conduct the workshop, and a team of four trained personnel from
the area would conduct it, usually in local language. Using “Open Learn-
ing Tools” such as the “Village Quality of Life Index,” the team gleaned
from the villagers an information base that was then used in the work-
shops.
The impact of fifty to sixty mobile teams conducting village workshops
on a monthly basis over a ten-year period made the sidt development
message more accessible to rural people than anything that had happened
in the past. Although commercial logging is currently a “hot button”
topic in Solomons, the Solomon Islands Development Trust’s mobile team
workshops, together with its publications such as Link, Komiks (Pijin-
English comics) and its theater team, were already making inroads into
village people’s consciousness during the early 1980s.
It became obvious, although slowly, that merely informing resource
owners that the logging companies were ripping them off was not suffi-
cient. Theater, print media, and the face-to-face sharing of information
were absolutely necessary but totally insufficient to cause something prac-
tical to be done about sustainable forestry. Alternative ways of harvesting
forest wealth had to be tried, perfected, and presented to landowning
groups. Out of this need the newest departments of the organization were
created: Conservation in Development (1991), which perfected ngali nut
oil production, fiber paper making, and ecotourism; and the Ecoforest
Unit (1994), which focused on training landowners to cut, mill, and sell
their own trees.
Public criticism of how Solomon Islands natural resources were being
traded off with little benefit to the nation’s resource owners did not go
over well among some government decision makers and the logging
industry. Violence, the killing of Mr Sony Tong, brought things to a head.
The managing director of Kyuken Timbers, Mr Koo, an overseas Chinese,
was arrested and imprisoned to await trial for his part in the murder, but
unfortunately, the plane that was carrying the only witness to the crime to
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southern Guadalcanal in September 1991. All fifteen passengers died
instantly. Mr Tong’s murderer, who had previously been convicted of the
murder and transferred to another island for his own safety, was among
them. Exactly who had paid the “hit man” to commit the crime has never
been established in a court of law.
Splitting the Nation
Commercial logging, like no other issue, has split the young nation. Since
1978 no other single activity has caused so much hurt and distrust and
produced a growing gap of suspicion among families and clan lines and
between provinces and the central government.
The Central Bank of Solomon Islands annual report for 1994 made it
clear that the Solomons was in the midst of a logging boom: “For the
third consecutive year, the rate of forest extraction continued unabated,
responding to the very high log prices experienced especially in mid-
1994.” Only recently, in 1993, had forestry become the largest foreign
exchange earner. “Timber exports have jumped from si$110 million (36
percent of total merchandise exports) in 1992 to si$230 million (55 per-
cent of total merchandise exports) in 1993” (World Bank 1995).
Fortunately, during the same period, late 1980s and early 1990s, the
community of nongovernment organizations involved with environmen-
tal issues gained ground as well. The Development Services Exchange
(dse), the local umbrella organization, grew slowly during the 1980s
from a handful of concerned groups to more than fifty dues-paying orga-
nizations. Although a majority of these focused on social issues (for
example, the disabled, youth, women’s issues, and rural training), a few
became vocal about the environment. Soltrust began its operations in the
Solomons in 1986, Greenpeace in 1991, and the Nature Conservancy in
1992. It became evident to the ngo community as well as concerned citi-
zens that the government, with its great need of revenue, as well as the
logging industry’s need of hardwood trees, had different priorities from
resource owners when it came to the sustainable harvesting of the
nation’s rain-forest wealth.
Logging companies were positioning themselves to cash in on the
world’s ever-expanding hardwood market, coinciding neatly with the
“unsustainable increase in government domestic borrowing.” Actual pro-
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than the sustainable level of 250,000 cubic meters a year. Even the Solo-
mon Islands Forest Industries Association argued that there should be a
gradual increase in the duty on logs, above a certain benchmark price, to
achieve a sustainable level of harvesting (cbsi 1995). The government’s
blessing on the commercial log feeding frenzy, the growth and activity of
environmentally concerned nongovernment organizations, and citizens’
attention to sustainable development trends came to a head with the
Pavuvu Island controversy in the middle of 1995.
The Pavuvu Island Controversy
The Pavuvu Island case study shows how nongovernment organizations,
local people, and government officials interacted over an issue of national
importance. It became, also, an example of how nongovernment organ-
izations are increasingly assuming public leadership roles, once thought
to be exclusively those of elected officials. The Pavuvu issue is as much
about information sharing, democratic ideals, and authority as it is about
foreign logging companies. It is about the rights of citizens to use all legal
methods to voice their understandings, concerns, and interests.
The British colonial government leased Pavuvu Island to Levers Pacific
Plantations in 1905 in exchange for a few bottles, some tins, and a hand-
ful of beads. The island, however, is a valuable piece of real estate—
approximately 6287 hectares of commercial forest with a total harvest-
able volume of 895,268 cubic meters of log resources. Experts believe
that the Pavuvu forest is worth us$120 million (Billy 1995). Pavuvu’s
original owners, the Lavukal people of the Russell Islands, have over
many years pleaded with past governor-generals, prime ministers, govern-
ment officials, and their own members of parliament for the return of the
island to its rightful owners. All to no avail (Rose 1995).
On 10 March 1995, the newly elected executive of Central Province
(constituted on 8 March) hastily granted Marving Brothers a business
license that allowed the central government to issue a logging permit for
Pavuvu Island. The government promised the Lavukal people develop-
ment, including clinics, schools, roads, and a large agricultural project,
once the logging operations were completed. However, many Lavukal
people held serious reservations about allowing their land to be logged.
These villagers, although having their homes on the small islands off the
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storehouse, and food producer, and especially as a source of fresh water.
Commercial logging, they knew, would deprive them of these life sources
and no amount of money or development would make up for the loss.
Landowners sent a letter to the Ministry of Environment, Forestry and
Conservation threatening to burn down any logging equipment arriving
there (Link 36, 1995). Some men did indeed torch three bulldozers on 3
July.
On 12 April the government became worried about the public’s reac-
tions to its plans and sent a four-man delegation led by Forest Minister
Allan Kemakeza to present once again the government’s decisions for the
area. On the same ship that brought the government party over from the
capital, Honiara, a police field force was sent to provide security for both
the government officers and the Marving Brothers’ heavy-duty logging
equipment.
During the first part of May, the Solomon Islands Development Trust
conducted a survey of Pavuvu wherein more than 650 people—mostly
from the town area but a good number of village people as well—
responded to a series of eight questions. More than 90 percent of
the people polled disagreed with the statement: “Government has the
first say over development on Pavuvu Island.” Almost 84 percent were
convinced that Pavuvu Islanders themselves had the first say over
development plans on the island (sidt 1995). Survey results were pre-
sented in Honiara on 18 May at a public meeting attended by 150
people. The survey results were shared with government officials as well.
At approximately the same time, 14–17 May, the Development Services
Exchange sent its own fact-finding delegation—including some of its
own members and members of Greenpeace and the Save the Children
Foundation—to meet “with Landowners and to get first hand infor-
mation on the Pavuvu issue” (Billy 1995). Its report was made public
by 20 May.
A Parliamentary Opposition Mission traveled by ship to Pavuvu on the
same date as the ngo mission, 14 May. It was led by the Honourable
Joses Tuhanuku, the opposition spokesman on Forestry, Environment and
Conservation, the Honourable Hilda Kari, an opposition member of
parliament, and Mr Patterson Oti, the secretary to the leader of the
opposition. On 24 May the mission tabled its report, which recom-
mended that “Logging on Pavuvu by Marving Bros. should be immedi-
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portions of alienated land on Pavuvu to Lavukal Resources Development
Company” (Tuhanuku 1995).
Prime Minister Mamaloni’s response to what he took as a public
rebuke to his authority was swift. On 22 May he issued a written public
warning singling out the ngo community at large and its expatriate advis-
ers in particular “not to interfere in internal government development
matters of Solomon Islands and to refrain from feeding the media with
false information.” He also claimed, without offering a shred of evidence,
that “These ngo personals (sic) are the same characters who have desta-
bilised Papua New Guinea during the past ten years and have now come
here to do the same to our people and country” (Mamaloni 1995).
The ngo response to the prime minister’s statement was swift and to
the point. The day after the prime minister’s national security decree, on
23 May, the Development Services Exchange faxed its public response to
the Office of the Prime Minister as well as to the media. The statement
said the Development Services Exchange was happy to hear that the gov-
ernment had been lenient with nongovernment organizations over the
years. It applauded this leniency for it was a sure sign of democracy at
work. However, the Development Services Exchange was appalled at the
accusations made by the Office of the Prime Minister. It saw “this accusa-
tion as unfounded and ask[ed] the officer responsible to substantiate the
facts of the accusation or apologise to the wrongly accused ngo commu-
nity” (dse 1995).
Of course the ngo community did not expect a reply, and they were
not disappointed. The government offered neither apology, retraction,
nor proof of the accusations made. The Honourable Ezekiel Alebua, par-
liamentarian and member of the opposition, was saddened by the prime
minister’s threatening attitude toward nongovernment organizations and
their expatriate workers. The prime minister’s statement was given, he
said, “to protect the interests of foreign logging companies and not [those
of] Solomon Islanders” (Link 36, 1995).
“On 28 May the Government made a Secret Mission to the Russell
Islands to carry out a referendum on the Pavuvu Issue” as stated in its
own document (sig 1995). The Honourable Sir Baddeley Devesi, leader
of the opposition in parliament, decried the government’s “secret mis-
sion” to Pavuvu wherein nine people, two of whom were ministers, “con-
ducted a pseudo-referendum” (Devesi 1995). As Devesi pointed out, only
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respond to the form” (Devesi 1995).
Augustine Rose, a Pavuvu landowner and lawyer, asked police permis-
sion for a public march to parliament, which was refused. However, a
peaceful demonstration was allowed, and on 22 June more than three
hundred Russell Island supporters, mostly from the ngo sector, presented
their petition to the deputy prime minister at Parliament House (the
prime minister was said to be sick at the time).
On the last day of June, the government tabled its Pavuvu report:
Pavuvu Development Profile: A Model for Integrated Agro-Forestry and
Land Settlement Scheme in parliament (sig 1995). Although the docu-
ment is more than eighty pages long, it focuses on only one way to har-
vest the nation’s forests: the exporting of round logs. The document is
written with a pro-logging stance, defending the government’s actions
because of its great need for revenue. There is no copy of the actual ques-
tions asked of the Russell Island people. It is not clear whether the survey
was focusing on a resettlement scheme, on logging, or on the govern-
ment’s development promises.
Responses to the report from parliament’s opposition members, the
ngo community, and Russell Islanders themselves were uniformly nega-
tive: the survey was poorly conceived, unprofessionally conducted, and
biased in its reporting. The Honourable Joses Tuhanuku, spokesman for
the opposition, called it “a joke” while speaking on it in parliament (Link
36, 1995).
Pavuvu Island, Going beyond Logging
The Pavuvu Island issue has gone beyond a simple case of foreign logging
interests felling and exporting round logs against the expressed wishes of
the majority of the landowners. It has become a case of the government
growing deaf to the voice of its people, and a citizenry determined to have
its say.
When sections of society, in this case nongovernment organizations,
raised their voice in opposition, the prime minister used intimidation to
silence them. The government pressured and threatened the legitimate
questioning of its citizens. The ngo reaction to this intimidation was to
respond with courtesy, but forcefully, that it would not be cowed by the
use of unsubstantiated accusations and the use of intimidation tactics.
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tion-sharing methods. The Solomon Islands Development Trust’s use of
Link magazine, its ability to reach out and test public opinion (eg,
through the Pavuvu Survey), and especially its mobilization tactic of using
dozens of workers to share the other side of the story with villagers is
vital for the health of Solomons democracy. The government’s reaction in
the face of the nongovernment organizations’ spirited defense of rights
has been one of total silence.
In July 1995, Solomon Islands celebrated its seventeenth anniversary of
independence, but in the Pavuvu Island issue its top decision makers
reverted to an old colonial pressure tactic of fear and intimidation. How-
ever, Solomon Island citizens refused to buckle or back down. Although
Marving Brothers continues to export round logs, it and the government’s
decision makers have become much more aware of the ngo involvement.
The company now seeks to extend its logging on customary land, but the
ngo community, as well as other concerned citizens, is closely monitoring
the situation. Marving Brothers won the first Pavuvu battle. However, the
war continues. The ngo community will continue the fight for what it
sees as not only a destructive development practice but a case of a govern-
ment growing increasingly deaf to the legitimate voice of its people.
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Abstract
The scattered nature of Solomon Island villages, the people’s low literacy rate,
and the country’s many languages make it difficult to share development and
environment messages effectively. Solomon Islands Development Trust has had a
fourteen-year track record of reaching out to the village sector through its fifty
mobile teams as well as its media arm, theater team, and departments focusing
on sustainable forestry practices. It has become a major actor in combating de-
structive logging practices. The Pavuvu controversy focused national attention
on the destructive practices of an overseas logging company, the government’s
dire need to gain revenue through logging, and the public stance of nongovern-
ment organizations against the logging companies and the government. The
Pavuvu controversy clarified for many that the logging issue was not simply
about logging versus not logging, but more about the kind of government the
country was experiencing.
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owners, Solomon Islands Development Trust.
